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NOTE
DON’T TAKE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PURELY
PERSONALLY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL




On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby.1 Since then a hotly debated topic in legal and political circles
is whether for-profit corporations have the right to operate in accordance
with the religious dictates of their owners.2 Opponents of religious free-
exercise rights for for-profit corporations make two main points. First, re-
ligion is something only natural persons are capable of practicing.3 Since
corporations are artificial persons rather than natural persons, they are inca-
pable of practicing religion.4 Second, granting for-profit corporations the
ability to practice religion will inevitably lead to a parade of horribles, such
as discrimination against women and the LGBT community, denial of cov-
erage for life-saving medical care, and the gutting of worker protection laws
such as the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).5
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grateful to Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen for his guidance and counsel throughout the writing
process of this Note; to the editors at the University of St. Thomas Law Journal, most especially to
Ms. Rachel Arneson, for patiently working with me throughout the editing process; to Professors
Thomas Berg, Teresa Collett, William Wagner, Mark Rienzi, and Mr. Jason Adkins, Esq. for
mentoring me and inspiring my interest in this topic; to my parents, Peter and Renee Blissenbach;
to my seven siblings, for the love and support they have always shown me; and, most of all, to
Jesus Christ, to whom this Note is dedicated, for suffering and dying on the cross out of love for
me.
1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
2. Ross Douthat, A Company Liberals Could Love, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2014, http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/opinion/sunday/rossdouthatacompanyliberalscouldlove.html.
3. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 694–702 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting); see
also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
4. Id.
5. Korte, 735 F.3d at 689–93; see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2807 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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In this paper I will refute both arguments. First, I will show how free
exercise of religion extends to both natural persons and to artificial persons
such as corporations. Then, I will reveal that a parade of horribles resulting
from granting for-profit corporations the ability to practice religion is un-
likely to occur, but even if one does occur, it should be embraced as a
necessary consequence of protecting the natural right of every man, woman,
and corporation to follow the commands of God.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
EXTENDS TO CORPORATIONS BECAUSE IT IS NOT
A “PURELY PERSONAL” RIGHT
Some opponents of extending free exercise rights to for-profit corpora-
tions argue that free exercise of religion is a “purely personal”6 right that
extends only to natural persons.7 An examination of both relevant Supreme
Court precedent and the meaning of “free exercise” at the time of the draft-
ing of the First Amendment, however, shows that freedom of religion is not
a “purely personal” right inapplicable to corporations.8 To demonstrate this,
I first turn to Supreme Court precedent on the subject of corporate
personhood.
A. The Bellotti “Purely Personal” Test
The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed that corporations are per-
sons, most recently in First National Bank v. Bellotti,9 and Citizens United
v. F.E.C.10 Both cases dealt with political speech restrictions applied to
corporations.11
In Bellotti, the Court spelled out a test in footnote 14 to determine
whether or not a corporation is afforded a right granted to a natural person
under the Constitution.
Corporate identity has been determinative in several decisions de-
nying corporations certain constitutional rights, such as the privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination, or equality with
individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy, but this is not
because the States are free to define the rights of their creatures
without constitutional limit. Otherwise, corporations could be de-
nied the protection of all constitutional guarantees, including due
process and the equal protection of the laws. Certain “purely per-
sonal” guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory self-
6. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978).
7. Korte, 735 F.3d at 701 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
8. See generally Brief of the Christian Booksellers Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae Support of
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos.
13–354, 13–356), 2014 WL 343200.
9. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
10. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
11. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 886–87.
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incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and other organiza-
tions because the “historic function” of the particular guarantee
has been limited to the protection of individuals. Whether or not a
particular guarantee is “purely personal” or is unavailable to cor-
porations for some other reason depends on the nature, history,
and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.12
Hence, determining whether or not the Free Exercise Clause applies to
corporations requires an examination of the understanding of “free exer-
cise” at the time of the drafting of the First Amendment. This is the topic
that we shall explore next.
B. The Founding Fathers’ Understanding of Religious Free Exercise
In the late eighteenth century, “free exercise” was understood to in-
clude “various forms of free public religious action—religious speech, re-
ligious worship, religious assembly, religious publication, religious
education, among others.”13 When glancing at this list, one notices that
some of these activities are capable of being exercised by groups, and some,
such as religious assembly, religious publication, and religious education,
are even activities that are generally or exclusively conducted by groups of
persons.14 Free exercise, therefore, was probably not understood by the
drafters of the First Amendment as something that extended only to individ-
uals.15 It is thus likely that the drafters of the First Amendment intended the
Free Exercise Clause’s protections to extend to groups of natural persons.16
Since corporations are groups of natural persons, they would have likely
been considered capable of exercising religion.17
Judge Timothy Tymkovich explained why this is the case in his major-
ity opinion for the Tenth Circuit in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius:18
It is beyond question that associations—not just individuals—
have Free Exercise rights: “An individual’s freedom to speak, to
worship, and to petition the government for the redress of griev-
ances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the
State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort to-
ward those ends were not also guaranteed.” Therefore, courts
have “recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging
in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, as-
sembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of
12. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14.
13. John Witte, Jr., Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional
Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 395 (1996).
14. See generally Brief of the Christian Booksellers Ass’n, supra note 8.
15. Id. at 8–20.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d, Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of
this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual
liberties.” Accordingly, the Free Exercise Clause is not a “‘purely
personal’ guarantee . . . unavailable to corporations and other or-
ganizations because the ‘historic function’ of the particular [con-
stitutional] guarantee has been limited to the protection of
individuals.” As should be obvious, the Free Exercise Clause at
least extends to associations like churches—including those that
incorporate.19
C. The Supreme Court’s Rulings in Lukumi and Hobby Lobby
Demonstrate That Some Corporations Can Exercise Religion
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,20 a Santeria
church organized as a nonprofit corporation was found to have standing to
challenge a city ordinance seeking to outlaw the animal sacrifices that form
an essential part of the Santeria religion’s worship services.21 As Judge Di-
ane Sykes of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit notes in her
majority opinion in Korte v. Sebelius, the church in Lukumi “[was] not in
court solely asserting the rights of [its] members based on associational
standing” but was “asserting [its] own rights too.”22 Since the church was
organized as a corporation, the fact that it was found to have standing to
assert violations of its own religious freedom, and not just the religious
freedom of its members, indicates corporations are not categorically pre-
cluded from the religious free exercise protections of the First
Amendment.23
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
closely-held corporations are persons under the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993, reasoning that:
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human
beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law speci-
fies the rights and obligations of the people (including sharehold-
ers, officers, and employees) who are associated with a
corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether constitu-
tional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to
protect the rights of these people. For example, extending Fourth
Amendment protection to corporations protects the privacy inter-
ests of employees and others associated with the company. Pro-
tecting corporations from government seizure of their property
without just compensation protects all those who have a stake in
the corporations’ financial well-being. And protecting the free-
19. Id. at 1133–34 (internal citations omitted).
20. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
21. Id. at 525–27.
22. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 675 (7th Cir. 2013).
23. Id.
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exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and
Mardel protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and
control those companies.24
The Court’s reasoning, then, is that corporations have rights because
the people who own and operate them have rights.25 Granting rights, such
as religious liberty, to corporations is done in order to safeguard the relig-
ious beliefs of their owners and operators.26
Hence, relevant Supreme Court precedent and an examination of the
First Amendment drafters’ understanding of the phrase “free exercise”
demonstrate that at least some corporations are capable of exercising relig-
ion under the Free Exercise Clause.
III. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT A PARADE OF HORRIBLES WILL FOLLOW
IF FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS ARE GRANTED
TO FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS
The final main argument that opponents of granting free exercise
rights to for-profit corporations make is the “parade of horribles” argument.
This argument is articulated by the Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Inc. (Lambda Legal), an LGBT rights advocacy group, in their ami-
cus curiae brief filed in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.27 Lambda Legal’s argu-
ment is presented as follows:
Many employees, like many business owners, hold religious and
other beliefs that guide their lives. Those beliefs remain with
them when entering their shared place of business. As recognized
in the decisions discussed above, permitting owners of for-profit
companies to interject themselves into employees’ home lives and
decisions concerning fertility, birth control, and childbearing—
which the Companies’ arguments do—not only would encourage
others to do the same, but would subvert compelling interests in
autonomy, public health, and gender equity served by the rule the
Companies resist. The Companies offer no limiting principle and,
indeed, there is none. Religious critiques of contraception can as
easily be leveled at sterilization, infertility care, and decisions be-
tween vaginal delivery and caesarian section. How does auton-
omy survive an employer’s line-item veto of insurance coverage
that pokes and prods personal decisions by shifting costs from
health plan to worker? Stepping back from the reproductive
health context of these cases, imagine how our nation’s work-
place standards would be transformed were this Court to embrace
24. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See generally Brief of Lambda Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos.
13–354, 13–356), 2014 WL 334441 [hereinafter Lambda Legal Amicus Brief].
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the approach the Companies request. Business owners with relig-
ious objections to blood transfusion could exempt that life-saving
service from their employees’ health coverage. They could selec-
tively exclude coverage for “sinful” medications that control pain,
alleviate depression, or manage HIV. Those who believe that all
modern medical treatments interfere with Divine will could refuse
coverage for all but faith healing.28
Lambda Legal’s main concern, therefore, is that granting free exercise
rights to for-profit corporations would render meaningless the strong legal
protections afforded to the rights of workers via laws like the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1965, and the FMLA, if corporations were granted protection under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. I find the scenario Lambda
Legal lays out unlikely to happen under a First Amendment analysis due to
the test that the Supreme Court outlined in Employment Division Depart-
ment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.29
A. Employment Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith
In Smith, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, the plaintiffs, had been fired
by the employer, a private drug rehabilitation organization, for smoking pe-
yote, a hallucinogenic drug.30 Smith and Black’s reason for smoking peyote
was religious, as smoking peyote is a sacrament in the Native American
Church, a religious body of which both are members.31 Smith and Black
then applied for unemployment benefits, but were denied because their rea-
son for being fired was breaking a law (peyote smoking was illegal in Ore-
gon at the time, even for religious purposes).32 Smith and Black then
challenged their denial of unemployment benefits, claiming that the denial
violated their Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment.33
The Court held that Oregon’s criminal ban on peyote was constitu-
tional because it was a “valid and neutral law of general applicability,”34
meaning that the law applied to everyone and did not target any particular
group of religious believers.35 Laws that are neutral and generally applica-
ble, the Court explained, do not violate the First Amendment even if they
forbid conduct that a religion mandates or vice versa.36 In Lukumi, the
28. Id. at 28–29.
29. Emp’t Div. Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990).




34. Id. at 879.
35. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
36. Id.
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Court provides further clarification on what makes a law “neutral” and
“generally applicable.”37
B. Neutrality
Justice Anthony Kennedy states in the majority opinion in Lukumi that
“[I]f the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of
their religious motivation, the law is not neutral.”38 Moreover, the law must
be both facially neutral and operationally neutral to pass the Smith test.39
The city ordinance forbidding animal slaughter struck down in Lukumi, al-
though facially neutral, was found not to be operationally neutral because it
did not overtly ban Santeria animal sacrifices.40 An examination of the mo-
tives for passing the ordinance and the many exceptions to the animal
slaughter ban revealed that it was designed to forbid the practice of the
Santeria religion within the city’s border.41
C. General Applicability
Having clarified the neutrality prong of the Smith test, Justice Kennedy
then proceeded to discuss the test’s second prong, the requirement of “gen-
eral applicability.”42 Although he did not precisely define what “general
applicability” is, he does say that the challenged animal slaughter ban fell
well short of it because it effectively exempted every form of animal
slaughter other than for religious rituals.43 Hence, the ordinance was not
generally applicable.44
Because the Court does not clearly define “general applicability” under
the Smith test, several interpretations have been proposed.45 One such inter-
pretation is offered by then-Judge Samuel Alito in his majority opinion in
Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge 12 v. City of Newark.46 In Frater-
nal Order of Police, Muslim police officers whose faith requires them to
wear beards challenged a no-beards policy that the Newark Police Depart-
ment had followed since 1971.47 The Newark Police Department’s rationale
behind the policy was a uniform appearance of their police officers.48 Alito
found that the policy’s existing exception for officers with a medical condi-
tion had already undermined the police department’s interest in a uniform
37. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
38. Id. at 533.
39. Id. at 534.
40. Id. at 537–39.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 542.
43. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543–46.
44. Id.
45. THOMAS C. BERG, THE STATE AND RELIGION IN A NUTSHELL 118 (2d ed. 2004).
46. Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (1999).
47. Id. at 360.
48. Id. at 366.
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appearance for their police officers.49 Consequently, the requirement was
not generally applicable and the second prong of the Smith test was not
satisfied.50
Another possible interpretation of the test, advanced by Professor
Douglas Laycock, is what he describes as the “most favored nation”51 inter-
pretation, in which religious practices must be treated at least equal to the
most favorably treated secular practices under the particular law.52
Regardless of which interpretation is correct, however, in order for a
law to pass the Smith test, it must not facially or operationally target any
particular religious group or groups and not contain so many exemptions
that it is apparent that the law was enacted to disfavor the practice of one or
more religions.53 So long as those two criteria are met, the government’s
law will pass constitutional muster even if it substantially burdens the abil-
ity of individual religious believers or groups of religious believers to prac-
tice their faith.54
Moreover, even if a law fails the Smith test, the government can still
prevail under the strict scrutiny evaluation that applies in those cases if it
demonstrates a compelling state interest.55 For example, the Supreme Court
has decided in previous cases that the functionality of the Social Security
System56 and combating racial discrimination57 are sufficiently compelling
interests to permit the government to substantially burden the religious free
exercise rights of citizens.
Granting free exercise rights to corporations, hence, doesn’t mean that
the corporation’s religious interests will always prevail over the govern-
ment’s interests. The Smith test is highly deferential to the government and
very easy to satisfy.58 Thus, Lambda Legal’s concerns about major civil
rights legislation being undermined by granting corporations free exercise
rights are unwarranted under present Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.
IV. THE PARADE OF HORRIBLES, IF IT OCCURS, SHOULD BE EMBRACED
AS NECESSARY TO PROTECT RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
As stated above, I find it unlikely, given the Supreme Court’s decision
in Smith, that the scenario Lambda Legal outlines in their amicus brief will
come to pass. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise
49. Id.
50. BERG, supra note 45, at 121.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 118–21.
54. Id.
55. Emp’t Div. Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990).
56. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–61 (1982).
57. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
58. BERG, supra note 45.
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Clause in Smith, however, is not the only possible interpretation.59 Michael
Stokes Paulsen offers an alternative understanding of the Free Exercise
Clause in The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty.60
Paulsen labels his interpretation the “pro-exemption reading”61 of the
Free Exercise Clause and outlines it as follows:
The Free Exercise Clause is properly understood as conferring
broad substantive immunity from government laws or regulations
that would operate to prohibit sincere religious belief and exer-
cise. As long as a claimed religious practice is truly religious, not
pretextual, and has any plausible claim to religious truth—that is,
as long as the claimed religious right is not contrary to the clear,
universal moral command of God, resulting in serious harms
outside the truly consenting, sincerely confessing community of
faith—the state’s rule must yield in the specific instance.62
Paulsen then proceeds to discuss the “non-discrimination rule”63 read-
ing of the Free Exercise Clause adopted by the Supreme Court in Smith, in
which the Free Exercise Clause only prohibits federal laws (and, via the
Fourteenth Amendment, state laws) that specifically target and discriminate
against religious practices.64 Since either interpretation is plausible based
on the text of the Free Exercise Clause itself, Paulsen argues, we need to
examine the broader logic and structure of the Clause.65 Reading the Clause
from a “non-religious perspective” leads to the non-discrimination interpre-
tation, whereas reading the Clause from the perspective that religious exer-
cise is an “inalienable right” conferred by God upon mankind leads to the
pro-exemptions interpretation.66 Paulsen contends that the non-discrimina-
tion interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is incorrect.67 I agree with
him for two main reasons.
First, Paulsen is right that the “non-religious perspective” interpreta-
tion “[fails] to serve the purposes for which the right presumably exists.”68
This is because such an interpretation allows the government to bypass the
Clause’s protections by enacting facially-neutral, generally applicable laws
that force religious believers to act contrary to their religious beliefs, effec-
tively forbidding them from living the dictates of their religion.69 Given the
broad array of religious expression considered “free exercise of religion” at
59. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L.
REV. 1159, 1191 (2013).
60. Id. at 1191–1206.
61. Id. at 1191.
62. Id. at 1162.
63. Id. at 1191.
64. Id. at 1190.
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the time of the adoption of the amendment70 it makes no sense for the
Founding Fathers to, on the one hand extend constitutional protection to a
broad swath of religious activity, and on the other hand “permit the govern-
ment to circumvent religious freedom”71 so easily.
Second, the Declaration of Independence and other documents au-
thored by the Founding Fathers clearly demonstrate that they understood all
rights as having their origin in God.72 If this is the case, then, as Paulsen
argues, the “non-religious” reading of the Free Exercise Clause is nonsensi-
cal because:
[f]rom the perspective that credits the possibility that there is such
a thing as a God whose commands have priority, and that takes as
its starting point the proposition that religious freedom is the
state’s recognition of the strong presumptive validity of that or-
dering of priorities, it makes little sense to read the Free Exercise
Clause as anything other than ousting state authority over the be-
liever’s conduct, wherever and whenever such state authority is in
genuine conflict with genuine religious obligation.73
Thus, since the Founding Fathers understood the origin of rights as
God rather than positive law, and the Free Exercise Clause granted protec-
tion to a wide array of religious activity, it is unlikely that the non-discrimi-
nation reading of the Free Exercise Clause is the reading that was intended
by the Founding Fathers.
A. The Parade of Horribles Objection to the Pro-Exemption Reading
Lambda Legal and others, however, would likely object to such an
interpretation on the grounds that it will lead to the parade of horribles they
outlined in their amicus brief.74 Lambda Legal’s concerns are valid, and
there will undoubtedly be situations where citizens will need to assume ex-
tra burdens as a result of accommodating the religious practices of other
citizens. However, if such a parade of horribles occurs, it is the necessary
side effect of ensuring “the priority of God’s true claims on human conduct
over any competing obligation imposed by Man.”75
The right to religious freedom does not, however, give a person the
right to religious exemptions to things that clearly violate the universal
moral command of God, as Paulsen points out, because in those situations
we know clearly what God commands.76 Absent such a situation, the law
70. Witte, supra note 13, at 395.
71. Paulsen, supra note 59, at 1192.
72. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1–2 (U.S. 1776); Paulsen, supra note 59,
at 1204.
73. Paulsen, supra note 59, at 1192.
74. Lambda Legal Amicus Brief, supra note 27, at 28–29.
75. Paulsen, supra note 59, at 1222.
76. Id. at 1213.
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must give way to the person’s religious belief so long as that belief is sin-
cere.77 Where the law of man contradicts what a man or woman sincerely
believes to be a command of God, the law of man must give way to the law
of God so long as that dictate does not contravene what society knows to be
the universal moral law.78 As the Youth Catechism of the Catholic Church
(YOUCAT) aptly states, “God wishes us to acknowledge his love and even
now to live our whole life in relation with him.”79 Giving government the
power to “circumvent religious freedom seemingly at will”80 effectively
robs every human being of the freedom to live their lives in accordance
with God’s commands.81
V. CONCLUSION
Having examined both main arguments against granting free exercise
rights to for-profit corporations, I conclude that they both fail. Contrary to
the claims of corporate free-exercise opponents, religious free exercise is
not a “purely personal” right inapplicable to corporations.82 And, if granting
religious free exercise rights to corporations results in a parade of horribles,
then the parade of horribles should be embraced as the necessary conse-
quence of protecting the freedom of every natural and artificial person to
follow the commands of God, which no one, not even human rulers, has
any authority to impede or override.83
77. Id. at 1180.
78. Id. at 1211.
79. YOUCAT: YOUTH CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 45 (Christoph Scho¨nborn ed.,
Michael J. Miller trans., 2011).
80. Paulsen, supra note 59, at 1192.
81. Id. at 1177–78.
82. Hobby Lobby Inc. Stores v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1133–34 (10th Cir. 2013).
83. Id. at 1211.
